In addition to the podcast and the blog post, we also have a white paper titled Why Your Board Should Stop Approving Individual Loans. That white paper analyzes what the board’s role should be in overseeing the bank, and why approving individual loans threatens this oversight. If boards keep approving loans, we’re next going to have to look into how to address our concerns via Instagram, courrier pigeon, or smoke signals.
In case you didn’t get it from the title of this blog post, I think the answer is absolutely, 100 percent, yes! Bank Directors should not be approving individual loans, and Banks should not be asking their Directors to approve individual loans.
77 percent of executives and directors say their board or a board-level loan committee plays a role in approving credits, according to Bank Director’s 2019 Risk Survey. And Boards of smaller banks are even more likely to be involved in the loan approval process. According to the survey, almost three quarters of banks over $10 billion in assets do not have their directors approve loans, but over 80% of banks under $10 billion in assets continue to have board-approval of certain loans.
These survey results generally conform to our experience. Two weeks ago, Jim McAlpin and I had the pleasure of leading five peer group exchanges on corporate governance at the 2019 Bank Director Bank Board Training Forum. The issue of board approval of loans came up in multiple peer groups, but the reaction and dialogue were radically different based on the size of the institutions involved. In our peer group exchange involving the chairmen and lead directors of larger public institutions, one of the chairman phrased the topic along the lines of “is anyone still having their directors approve individual loans?” Not one director indicated that they continued to do so, and several agreed that having directors vote on loans was a bad practice.
A few hours later, we were leading a peer group exchange of the chairman and lead directors of smaller private institutions. Again, one participant raised the issue. This time the issue was raised in an open manner, with a chairman indicating that they’d heard from various professionals that they should reconsider the practice but so far their board was still asking for approval of individual loans. A majority of the directors in attendance indicated concurrence.
Bank merger activity is reducing the number of U.S. banks at a rate of about 5% per year. It’s unclear how long this pace of industry consolidation will continue. Investment bankers, who have an interest in the level of activity continuing, are often quick to counsel bank boards of directors that the merger market may never be better than it is right now. Each year, the boards of hundreds of banks decide to heed the advice of those suggesting it’s time to sell.
A decision to sell a bank is one of the two most important decisions a board addresses (the other being selection of the CEO in a succession process). The strength of a board lies in the manner in which it approaches such a decision. Some boards will have gone through a lengthy process of reaching consensus before exploring potential merger opportunities. Others will find themselves considering unexpected merger offers without first having reached consensus. Vigorous debate can be healthy and productive in the process of a board reaching the best decision for the bank and its shareholders. Regardless of the circumstances in which a potential sale or merger of a bank is being considered, it is critical that all board members have access to the same level of information and be able to provide input throughout the process.
When board members believe they have been kept out of the loop on information flow, or they haven’t been adequately involved in considering a course of action, the strength of a board is undercut. Decision making is often adversely impacted as a result. This is particularly true in connection with consideration of the sale of a bank. Throughout the process of a board investigating options and considering strategic alternatives, the board members should have confidence that they are privy to all communications of importance with both professional advisers and potential merger partners.
We have seen far too many instances in which a director, on his or her own initiative and without authorization from the board as a whole, embarks on private outreach to potential merger partners. These directors usually feel justified in such action as a result of frustration with the pace at which the full board is moving or a sense that the CEO is resistant to the idea of selling the bank. Whatever the driving force, such independent action by a director can result in a breakdown in trust among the board and rarely results in a successful merger transaction.
In this the new era of banking, our clients are continually looking for ways to enhance efficiency and effectiveness at all levels of their organizations. This line of thinking has led to the revolution of the bank branch and the adoption of many new technologies aimed at serving customers and automating or otherwise increasing process efficiency. Perhaps most importantly, however, banks have begun to focus on optimizing their governance structures and practices, particularly at the board level.
(A print version of this post if you’d like to print or share with others is available here.)
As we discuss this topic with our clients, the conversation quickly turns to the role and function of the bank’s director loan or credit committee, which we refer to herein as the “Loan Committee.” We continue to believe that Loan Committees should move away from the practice of making underwriting decisions on individual credits absent a specific legal requirement, and here we set forth the position that this change should be made in order to enhance Board effectiveness, not just to avoid potential liability.
Ensuring Board Effectiveness
Whenever we advise clients with regard to governance, our fundamental approach is to determine whether a given course of action helps or hinders the Board’s ability to carry out its core functions. Defining the core functions of a Board can be a difficult task. Fortunately, the staff of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System recently outlined its view of the core functions of a bank Board. We agree with the Federal Reserve’s outline of these functions as set forth in its proposed guidance regarding Board Effectiveness applicable to large banks, which was based on a study of the practices of high-performing boards. Based on our experiences, many of the concepts expressed in that proposed guidance constitute board best practices for banks of any asset size. The proposed guidance indicates that a board should:
set clear, aligned, and consistent direction;
actively manage information flow and board discussions;
hold senior management accountable;
support the independence and stature of independent risk management and internal audit; and
maintain a capable board composition and governance structure.
We believe that an evaluation of the board’s oversight role relative to the credit function is a necessary part of the proper, ongoing evaluation of a bank’s governance structure. As it conducts this self-analysis, a board should evaluate whether the practice of underwriting and making credit decisions on a credit-by-credit basis supports its pursuit of the first four functions. We believe that it likely does not.
Considering Individual Credit Decisions May Hinder the Committee’s Ability to Set Overall Direction for the Credit Function.
We have observed time and time again Loan Committee discussions diving “into the weeds” and, in our experience, once they are there they tend to stay there. In most Loan Committee meetings, the presenting officer directs the committee’s attention to an individual credit package and discusses the merits and challenges related to the proposal. Committee members then typically ask detailed questions about the particular financial metrics, borrower, or the intended project, assuming that any discussion occurs at all prior to taking a vote.
While it may sometimes be healthy to quiz officers on their understanding of a credit package, focusing on this level of detail may deprive the Loan Committee of the ability to focus on setting direction for the bank’s overall loan portfolio. In fact, in many of the discussions of individual credits, detailed questions about the individual loan package may in fact distract from the strategic and policy questions that really should be asked at the board level, such as “What is the market able to absorb with regard to projects of this type?” and “What is our overall exposure to this segment of our market?”
On the latest episode of The Bank Account, Jonathan and I address two items of significant interest in our office: (a) a recent Wall Street Journal opinion piece on the sanity of bank directors, and (b) the start the of college football season (not necessarily in that order).
When starting the podcast, we expected the podcast would offer listeners an opportunity to hear the conversations we have around the office on a wide variety of topics.
Today, that includes a topic that represents a significant part of our fall conversations, college football, with a particular focus on the SEC. As a Georgia Bulldog, Jonathan brings his bizarre view of the world, while as a Florida Gator, I correct him (or at least that’s how I see it, and I write the blog posts). If you want to participate in the conversation, please do not hesitate to reach out to either of us (Jonathan.Hightower@bryancave.com and @HightowerBanks or Robert.Klingler@bryancave.com and @RobertKlingler).
Following the football discussion, we get down to the real business of the day, the insanity of a recent Wall Street Journal Opinion piece. On August 28th, the Wall Street Journal published an opinion piece by Thomas Vartanian titled Why Would Anyone Sane be a Bank Director? Jonathan’s response, Why Sane People Serve as Bank Directors, is available here. Jonathan and I walk through aspects of Vartanian’s analysis that we agree with… as well as the many portions that we strongly disagree with. We also address a few other items related to the analysis of what should be involved in director’s roles on bank boards and the FDIC’s approach in litigation.
Bank directors have played a crucial role in the turnaround of the banking industry, an accomplishment that deserves recognition in light of the fact that it has been done under tremendous regulatory burden and tepid economic growth. Given that, why do we continue to question why the country’s most respected business people would be willing to serve as bank directors? Respected attorney and industry commentator Thomas Vartanian recently asked in an opinion piece in The Wall Street Journal, “Why would anyone sane be a bank director?” Well, sane people are serving as bank directors every day, and in doing so they are benefiting the economy without exposing themselves to undue risk.
(A print version of this post if you’d like to print or share with others is available here.)
The regulatory environment for bank directors is clearly improving. The Federal Reserve’s recent proposal to reassess the way in which it interacts with boards is appropriate if overdue, and the other banking agencies should follow the path that the Federal Reserve has set forth. We also witnessed the FDIC acting very aggressively in pursuing lawsuits against directors of failed banks in the wake of the financial crisis. However, suggesting that the FDIC relax its standards for pursuing cases against bank directors is not only unrealistic, it misses the greater point for the industry in that it needs to continue to refine its governance practices in order to provide for better decision-making by bank directors and to enhance protections from liability for individual directors.
In order to fully understand the point of this position, it is important to clear up a couple of commonly-held misconceptions. First, when the FDIC sues a bank director after a bank failure, it does so for the benefit of the Deposit Insurance Fund, which is essentially an insurance cooperative for the banking industry. As a result, the FDIC should be viewed as a purely economic actor, no different from any other plaintiff’s firm in the business of suing corporate directors. Lawsuits by FDIC should not be given any higher profile or greater credibility than any number of other suits against corporate directors that inevitability occur during market downturns. There should be no additional stigma, and certainly no additional fear, with regard to a claim by the FDIC on the basis that it is “the government.”
In the run up to the Fourth of July holiday, you may have missed that June 27 was the 50th anniversary of the first ATM and June 29 was the 10th anniversary of the first iPhone. I was struck by the coincidence of these two anniversaries occurring in the same week. It also caused me to revisit in my mind a concern that has been growing for some time.
During several recent bank board retreats and strategic planning sessions, I’ve witnessed the challenging dynamics that occur when leaders begin the process of “board refreshment.” Board refreshment is the current euphemism being used by consultants (and by the proxy advisory firms) to refer to the need for a closer match between the strategic goals of banks and the skill sets of board members. This need is especially apparent in the boards of many mid-sized regional and community banks.
We are living in a time of increasing change in the demographics (gender, race and age) of the customer base of banks, coupled with rapid technological developments which impact the ways in which commercial customers conduct their businesses and interact with other businesses, including with their banks. The typical board of a mid-sized regional or community bank, however, consists of men in their mid to upper-sixties who share similar backgrounds and whose perspectives were shaped during a different era for both business and banking. The concern I have is that continued adherence by banks to such board composition will result in competitive disadvantage.
I’ve been practicing law and advising banks for over 30 years, and for most of that period I don’t think it mattered as much how strong the typical community bank board was. What mattered was the strength and competency of the CEO, and it was a bonus if the bank had an energetic and engaged board of directors. I believe there is now an increasing need for stronger boards. Take a moment and consider how well equipped your board is to help guide your bank through the period of rapid change that is on the near term horizon.
On July 1, 2017, significant amendments to the director and officer liability provisions of Georgia’s Financial Institution Code and Business Corporation Code will take effect. These amendments, adopted as House Bill 192 during the 2017 General Assembly session and signed into law by Governor Deal in May, enhance the protections available to directors and officers of Georgia banks when they are sued for violating their duty of care to the bank. The amendments also apply to directors and officers of Georgia corporations, including bank holding companies.
First and foremost, House Bill 192 creates a statutory presumption, codified at O.C.G.A. § 7-1-490(c) for banks and at O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-830(c) and 14-2-842(c) for corporations, that a director or officer’s decision-making process was done in good faith and that the director or officer exercised due care. This presumption may be rebutted, however, by evidence that the process employed was grossly negligent, thus effectively creating a gross negligence standard of liability in civil lawsuits against directors and officers. This is a response to the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in FDIC v. Loudermilk, in which the Court recognized the existence of a strong business judgment rule in Georgia but also held that it did not supplant Georgia’s statutory standards of care requiring ordinary diligence. The Court interpreted the statutes as permitting ordinary negligence claims against directors and officers when they are premised on negligence in the decision-making process. (As you may recall, Loudermilk also held emphatically that claims challenging only the wisdom of a corporate decision, as opposed to the decision-making process, cannot be brought absent a showing of fraud, bad faith or an abuse of discretion. This part of the Loudermilk decision is unaffected by the new amendments.) Many Georgia banks and businesses expressed concern that allowing ordinary negligence suits would open the door to dubious and harassing litigation. The Court’s opinion noted these concerns but held that they were for the General Assembly to address.
As amended, O.C.G.A. § 7-1-490(c) and its corporate code counterparts will foreclose the possibility of ordinary negligence claims by requiring a plaintiff (which can be a shareholder, the bank or corporation itself, or a receiver or conservator) to show evidence of gross negligence, which the statutes define as a “gross deviation of the standard of care of a director or officer in a like position under similar circumstances.” It is important to note that the actual standard of care that directors and officers must exercise is essentially unchanged. As we have written in the past, it is important for a bank board in today’s legal and business environment to develop careful processes for all decisions that are entrusted to the board, and to follow those processes. A director should attend board meetings with reasonable regularity and should always act on an informed basis, which necessarily entails understanding the bank’s business, financial condition and overall affairs as well as facts relevant to the specific decision at issue. The new amendments should not be read as relaxing these requirements. The only thing that has changed is the standard of review that courts will follow when evaluating a process-related duty of care claim. By requiring plaintiffs to show gross negligence in order to defeat the statutory presumption, the amended statute should discourage the filing of dubious lawsuits, and also provide defendants with a strong basis for moving to dismiss such suits when they are filed. Many states, including Delaware, recognize a gross negligence floor for personal liability either by statute or under the common law. The amendments bring Georgia law more closely in line with these states.
From time to time we hear from bank senior management that their board doesn’t seem engaged, or that they can’t get a sustained conversation out of their board. Instead, board meetings consist of routine review of management reports, with motions, seconds, and unanimous adoptions of management recommendations without any meaningful discussion. Years of bank board meetings can go by without a single dissenting vote recorded in the bank’s board minutes. Regulators may being to question, perhaps correctly, that the board has merely become a rubber stamp for management, and that the board is merely “going through the motions” at each board meeting.
Over time, we have found one topic for which no board member can remain silent, and everyone (and I mean everyone) has an opinion.
What color should the bank’s new logo be?
Branch lobby carpet colors can also be quite effective, as can capitalization (grammar, not balance sheet, i.e. Fintech vs. FinTech), a change in mascot or marketing gimmick, or minor tweaks to branch hours.
In today’s competitive environment, some bank directors may view an acquisition offer from another financial institution as a relief. With directors facing questions of how to gain scale in the face of heightened regulatory scrutiny, increased investor expectations, and general concerns about the future prospects of community banks, a bona fide offer to purchase the bank can change even the most entrenched positions around the board table.
So, how should directors evaluate an offer to sell the bank? A good starting place is to consider the institution’s strategic plan to identify the most meaningful aspects of the offer to the bank’s shareholders. The board can also use the strategic plan to provide a baseline for the institution’s future prospects on an independent basis. With the help of a financial advisor, the board can evaluate the institution’s projected performance should it remain independent and determine what premium to shareholders the purchase offer presents. Not all offers present either the premium or liquidity sought by shareholders, and the board may conclude that continued independent operation will present better opportunities to shareholders.
Once the board has a framework for evaluating the offer, it should consider the financial aspects of the offer. The form of the merger consideration—be it all stock, all cash, or a mix of stock and cash—can dictate the level of due diligence into the business of the buyer that should be conducted by the selling institution.
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