We have heard a number of bankers state that they are concerned with accepting the TARP Capital, fearing potential future regulation imposed on those that accept government money. While each bank’s situation is unique, we generally consider this concern to be overstated for the following reasons:
- Once the TARP Capital is in place and the preferred stock and warrants are issued, the terms of those instruments are defined by contract. The government should not be able to modify the terms to give itself a better deal. For example, the government cannot require that the institution pay the 9% dividend before the expiration of five years.
- We believe that if the government decides to impose additional regulatory restrictions (which in this economic environment seems likely), it is more likely to do so with regard to the whole industry rather than distinguish between banks that accepted the TARP Capital and those that did not. From a policy perspective, Congress and the regulators may view “the whole industry” as having been helped and therefore that “the whole industry” should bear the burden of any additional regulations.
- The government already has broad powers to regulate financial institutions; it seems unlikely that the government would use its relatively weak power as a preferred shareholder to impose change when it has stronger regulatory powers to impose change.
- The government may impose one or more of the restrictions that are currently associated with the TARP Capital program on all companies – for example, it is possible that the executive compensation changes may be expanded to all companies, whether or not they have accepted (or were even eligible for) TARP Capital.
That’s our belief. We’d love to hear yours in the comments.